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PROLOGUE: HAZARDOUS WASTE CRISIS IN C6TE D'IVOIRE
The Probo Koala,1 a ship chartered by Trafigura Beheer BV, a Dutch
commodities trading company, docked in Abidjan, the capital of C6te
d'Ivoire, on August 19, 2006,2 to dispose of highly toxic "slops"-hazardous
waste created when oil tanks are washed out with caustic soda.3 The ship
offloaded the slops into trucks, ostensibly owned by a "certified local com-
pany, Compagnie Tommy."4 The trucks then fanned out around the capital,
dumping at least 500 tons of petrochemical waste' into at least 15 sites.6 The
slops contained hydrogen sulfide, which in concentrated doses is potentially
lethal.7 Residents were soon struck by the stench of rotten eggs8 and began
suffering from "nosebleeds, nausea and vomiting, headaches, skin and eye
irritation and respiratory symptoms."9 Ground water supplies and other
drinking water systems were contaminated. ° As of November 24, 2006, the
waste had killed at least twelve people and led over ioo,ooo individuals to
seek medical care.11
1. Lydia Polgreen & Marlise Simons, Globalization's Toxic Side, INT'L HERALD
TRIB., Oct. 3, 2006, at i. The Probo Koala was "a Greek-owned tanker flying a
Panamanian flag.., leased by the London branch of a Swiss trading corpora-
tion whose fiscal headquarters are in the Netherlands." Id.
2. Associated Press, Toxic Waste that Sickened Ivory Coast Arrives in French Port,
INT'L HERALD TRIB., Nov. 7, 2006, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/
ap/2oo6/l/O/europe/EUGEN FranceIvoryCoastWaste.php.
3. BBC News, More Die from Ivory Coast Waste, Sept. 12, 2006, http://news.bbc.
co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/africa/5335956.stm (last visited Nov. 15, 2007).
4. Id.
5. U.N. News Serv., C6te d'Ivoire: UN Helps Country Assess Impact of Deadly
Toxic Waste Dumping on Food Chain, Oct. 23, 2006,
http://allafrica.com/stories/2oo61o231256.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2007)
("The waste contained a mixture of petroleum distillates, hydrogen sulphide,
mercaptans, phenolic compounds and sodium hydroxide....").
6. Id.
7. Associated Press, supra note 2.
8. Polgreen & Simons, supra note 1.
9. U.N. News Serv., supra note 5.
10. News Release, U.N. Env't Programme, Donor Governments Should Support
On-Going C6te d'Ivoire Emergency, UNEP NEWS RELEASE (Dec. 14, 20o6),
available at http://unep.org/Documents. Multilingual/Default.asp?Document
ID=496&ArticlelD=5453&l=en.
11. C6te d'Ivoire: UN Ecology Chief Calls for International Funds to Clean Up Toxic
Dumping, U.N. DAILY NEWS, Nov. 24, 2006, at 6, available at http://www.un.
org/ news/dh/pdf/english/2oo6/24112o6.pdf.
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These hazardous wastes traveled thousands of miles to C6te d'Ivoire
from Amsterdam, where the Probo Koala first attempted to dispose of its
slops. When Amsterdam Port Authorities realized that the waste was highly
toxic, they informed Trafigura Beheer that the proper disposal of the waste
would cost $25o,ooo. The company balked at the cost and, with the permis-
sion of the Amsterdam Port Authorities, reloaded the slops onto their ship
and set sail for a cheaper port.12 The hazardous wastes were eventually
dumped in apparent violation of international law. 3 There has been no
indication that Trafigura received C6te d'Ivoire's consent to receive and
dispose of its slops, and C6te d'Ivoire does not have facilities capable of
handling high-level toxic waste.'
4
INTRODUCTION
Under current international legal precedent, victims injured by dump-
ing of hazardous waste in C6te d'Ivoire, as well as those harmed by similar
egregious environmental torts, may well go uncompensated. Although Afri-
can nations have characterized hazardous waste dumping as "a crime
against Africa and the African people,"' 5 the judiciaries in developing coun-
tries like C6te d'Ivoire are seldom equipped to provide relief, and illegal
dumping has the potential to cause major political and civil unrest. Con-
sider that the C6te d'Ivoire dumping led to a virtual collapse of the govern-
ment. Allegations that the government was corruptly involved with the
dumping fueled rioting, spurred originally by the government's slow and
limited response to the crisis. The President disbanded his cabinet. 6 Al-
though many of the ministers were later reinstated, both the transport and
12. Polgreen & Simons, supra note i.
13. U.N. hazardous waste expert Rudolph Walder stated, "It is very clear to me
that this product violates the Basel convention." U.N. Integrated Reg'l Info.
Networks, C6te d'Ivoire: French Executives Arrested in Toxic-Waste Scandal,
ALLAFRICA.COM, Sept. 19, 2006, http://allafrica.com/stories/2oo6o919o832.
html. "Dumping" is the illegal disposal of hazardous waste.
14. Polgreen & Simons, supra note 1.
15. C. Russell H. Shearer, Comparative Analysis of the Basel and Bamako Conven-
tions on Hazardous Waste, 23 ENVTL. L. 141, 149 (1993).
16. Lydia Polgreen & Marlise Simons, Global Sludge Ends in Tragedy for Ivory
Coast, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Oct. 2, 2006, at 1 ("The spreading illnesses
sparked violent demonstrations from a population convinced that govern-
ment corruption was to blame for the dumping, and ultimately the furor
forced the prime minister and his government to resign in September, though
much of the government was reinstated later. Six Ivorians, one Nigerian and
two European officials from Trafigura have been jailed so far in Ivory
Coast.").
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environmental ministers were replaced. 17 While this particular political
crisis may not speak directly to the judiciary, it indicates the potentially
volatile nature of governments in countries likely to be abused by illegal
dumping. Such volatility is only one hurdle among many rendering plain-
tiffs "little hope of recovery" in their home countries. 8
The dumping of hazardous waste is a violation of international law with
serious public health and environmental consequences, yet courts like those
in C6te d'Ivoire may not be able to adequately defend their victimized
populace. Plaintiffs in developing nations face "lack of democratic govern-
ance, inadequate environmental legislation, limited tort law, and low poten-
tial amounts granted from judgments." 9 In the C6te d'Ivoire crisis, the
President reportedly accepted a deal from Trafigura, wherein the company
would pay $152 million toward the clean up costs without ever accepting
either liability or responsibility for dumping the toxic wastes.20 In exchange
for the money, the President dropped charges against Trafigura and its ex-
ecutives. 2' However, there is no reason to assume that in future dumping
17. See U.N. Integrated Reg'l Info. Networks, supra note 13.
18. Hari M. Osofsky, Environmental Human Rights Under the Alien Tort Statute:
Redress for Indigenous Victims of Multinational Corporations, 20 SUFFOLK
TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 335, 340 (1997).
19. Id.
20. Press Release, Greenpeace Int'l, Greenpeace Condemns Trafigura-C6te d'Ivoire
Deal as Travesty of Justice (Feb. 14 2007), http://www.greenpeace.org/
international/press/releases/greenpeace-condemns-trafigura.
21. Id. The preclusive effect of government settlements on private party claims
varies as a matter of national law. See, e.g., Bi v. Union Carbide Chems. &
Plastic Co., 984 F.2d 582, 586 (2d Cir. 1993) (deferring "to the statute of a de-
mocratic country to resolve disputes created by a disaster of mass proportions
that occurred within that country" and holding that "[a]ny challenge appel-
lants may have to the settlement must be made through the legislative or judi-
cial channels that are available in India."). U.S. case law indicates that the
government can settle private claims without effecting an unconstitutional
taking because the government "may provide the claimants with benefits that
justify the taking, and therefore fulfill the 'just compensation' requirements of
the Constitution." Maria Gabriela Bianchini, Comment, The Tobacco Agree-
ment that Went Up in Smoke: Defining the Limits of Congressional Intervention
into Ongoing Mass Tort Litigation, 87 CAL. L. REV. 703, 737 (1999); see Shang-
hai Power Co. v. United States, 4 Ct. Cl. 237, 244 (1983) ("Because a govern-
ment's refusal to honor debts owed a foreign national is frequently sympto-
matic of more serious problems between the two countries, governments have
traditionally espoused and settled claims without the consent of the nationals
holding the claims and 'usually without exclusive regard for their interests, as
distinguished from those of the nation as a whole."' (citation omitted)); see
also Carter H. Strickland, Jr., Note, The Scope ofAuthority of Natural Resource
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crises, governments would be able to reach any sort of settlement with the
tortious company. Even if the government manages to settle, "it is feared
that the victims will ... receive little, if any, support from their government
in pursuing justice."2 2
However, there may be a light at the end of the tunnel for these and
similarly situated victims.23 The Alien Torts Claims Act (ATCA) provides
U.S. district courts with "original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien
for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the
United States." 4 Under ATCA precedent, aliens may bring claims against
both U.S. and foreign defendants, provided that the U.S. court has personal
jurisdiction over the defendant.25 Accordingly, the ATCA provides an op-
portunity for the victims of injustice to seek redress in U.S. courts.26
Trustees, 20 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 301, 322 (1995) ("[U]nder ordinary res judi-
cata rules, [government] settlement of CERCLA claims would preclude pri-
vate common law claims arising from the same event."). See generally Hanoch
Dagan & James J. White, Governments, Citizens, and Injurious Industries, 75
N.Y.U. L. REV. 354 (2000); Jennifer Joseph, Comment, POWs Left in the Cold:
Compensation Eludes American WWII Slave Laborers for Private Japanese
Companies, 29 PEPP. L. REV. 209, 213-14 (2001) ("Harold G. Maier, professor
of International Law at Vanderbilt University, claims: 'It is unclear whether
the United States government has the authority to waive private law claims by
the former POWs against private Japanese entities as part of a government-
to-government settlement. Normally a party cannot waive claims that it does
not own."').
22. Greenpeace Int'l, supra note 20.
23. The Basel Convention does not, itself, authorize a private right of action by
tort olaintiffs. Rather, the Basel Convention serves as evidence for a "law of
nations" against dumping. The Alien Tort Claims Act would provide plain-
tiffs seeking to recover for injuries caused by dumping a right of action in U.S.
courts. See Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., No. ol Civ.8118 (WHP), 2005 WL 1870811,
at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2005) (recognizing that under the ATCA "federal
courts have the authority to imply the existence of a private right of action for
violations of jus cogens norms of international law"); cf. Lisa T. Belenky, Cra-
dle to Border: U.S. Hazardous Waste Export Regulations and International Law,
17 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 95, 133 (1999) ("Under the Basel approach the waste is
either reshipped or disposed of properly, but no compensation is made to the
country that received the illegal wastes or to the importer who may have sig-
nificant damages, shipping costs, opportunity costs, or direct damages from
the waste. In addition, no compensation is made to other individuals whose
property or health may have been harmed by the lack of proper environ-
mental safeguards.")
24. Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA), 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
25. See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995); Cabiri v. Assasie-Gyimah, 921
F. Supp. 1189 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp 162 (D. Mass.
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In order for victims of environmental torts to successfully seek redress
under the ATCA, U.S. courts will need to recognize an environmental law of
nations.27 Thus far, the ATCA has primarily been used as a means of redress
for the victims of human rights violations.28 Courts have heard ATCA cases
involving claims of environmental torts but have yet to recognize a law of
1995). For a discussion of personal jurisdiction over foreign defendants in
ATCA suits, see Sarah M. Hall, Note, Multinational Corporations' Post-Unocal
Liabilities for Violations of International Law, 34 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV.
401, 406-08 (2002).
26. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
27. Plaintiffs might also be able to bring suit under the ATCA treaty clause. How-
ever, the treaty clause has, as of yet, been largely ignored by courts. For fur-
ther discussion of the plausibility of suits under the treaty prong, see Belenky,
supra note 23. See also Kristen D.A. Carpenter, The International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights: A Toothless Tiger?, 26 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 1
(2000); Beth Stephens, The Amorality of Profit: Transnational Corporations
and Human Rights, 2o BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 45 (2002). Previously, scholars
seeking to promote the ATCA as a forum to address environmental torts have
focused on the efficacy of structuring environmental tort claims such that
they were similar to other alleged human rights abuses. Even when Professor
Hari Osofsky argued convincingly that "environmental human rights have
developed sufficiently to be used as a basis for suits under the Alien Tort Stat-
ute," the core of her argument rested on the strength of indigenous people's
environmental human rights. Thus, although Professor Osofsky explored a
welcome, growing recognition of environmental torts in the international law
arena, she continued to structure environmental claims as secondary to and
dependent upon human rights claims. Osofsky, Environmental Human Rights
Under the Alien Tort Statute, supra note 18, at 339-40. For further discussion of
the relationship between environmentalism and indigenous rights, see S.
James Anaya, Environmentalism, Human Rights and Indigenous Peoples: A Tale
of Converging and Diverging Interests, 7 BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 1 (2000). Cf. Hari M.
Osofsky, Learning from Environmental Justice: A New Model for International
Environmental Rights, 24 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 71 (2005) (proposing a new advo-
cacy model in environmental justice for environmental harm to humans).
28. Although the ATCA was codified in 1789, it did not come into use until the
198os. See Joanna E. Arlow, Note, The Utility of ATCA and the "Law of Na-
tions" in Environmental Torts Litigation: Jota v. Texaco, Inc. and Large Scale
Environmental Destruction, 7 Wis. ENVTL. L.J. 93, 106 (2ooo) (noting that in
198o, the Second Circuit's decision in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d
Cir. 1980), revived the Act and established its connection with international
human rights law). See generally Lucien H. Dhooge, The Alien Tort Claims Act
and the Modern Transnational Enterprise: Deconstructing the Mythology of Ju-
dicial Activism, 35 GEO. J. INT'L L. 3 (2003).
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nations violation. 29 Rather, courts have found that references to the Stock-
holm Principles3" or to the principles of international environmental law
(the Polluter Pays Principle, the Precautionary Principle, and the Proximity
Principle)3' did not set forth specific proscriptions or enjoy consensus
among the international community. U.S. courts have thus far rejected the
concept of a general environmental law of nations-a law of nations based
on a vague international sense of responsibility toward the environment.
For U.S. courts to recognize an environmental law of nations, the law of
nations must be both supported by international consensus and explicitly
defined.
This Note argues that there is international consensus against dumping
hazardous waste in developing countries such that the norm against dump-
ing qualifies as a law of nations violation actionable under the ATCA. The
international consensus against dumping is demonstrated by numerous
treaties and multitudes of domestic legislation. Most notably, the Basel
Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous
Wastes and Their Disposal (Basel Convention),32 a multilateral treaty ad-
29. See, e.g., Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 343 F.3d 140 (2d Cir. 2003); Beanal v.
Freeport-McMoran, Inc. (Beanal II), 197 F.3d 161, 167 (5th Cir. 1999); Jota v.
Texaco, Inc., 157 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 1998); Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, 221 F. Supp.
2d 1116 (C.D. Cal. 2002); Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 2d 534
(S.D.N.Y. 2001); Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc. (Beanal I), 969 F. Supp.
362, 370 (E.D. La. 1997); Amlon Metals, Inc. v. FMC Corp., 775 F. Supp. 668
(S.D.N.Y. 1991).
30. See Amlon Metals, 775 F. Supp. at 671 (holding that invocations of the Stock-
holm Principles, United Nations Conference on the Human Environment,
adopted June 16, 1972, "do not establish a violation of such law under the
Alien Tort Statute... since those Principles do not set forth any specific pro-
scriptions, but rather refer only in a general sense to the responsibility of na-
tions to insure that activities within their jurisdiction do not cause damage to
the environment beyond their borders").
31. See Beanal 1, 969 F. Supp. at 384 ("The three principles relied on by Plaintiff,
standing alone, do not constitute international torts for which there is univer-
sal consensus in the international community as to their binding status and
their content." (citation omitted)); see also Beanal II, 197 F.3 d at 167 ("The
sources of international law cited by Beanal and the amici merely refer to a
general sense of environmental responsibility and state abstract rights and lib-
erties devoid of articulable or discernable standards and regulations to iden-
tify practices that constitute international environmental abuses or torts.").
32. Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movement of Hazardous
Wastes and Their Disposal, Mar. 22, 1989, 1673 U.N.T.S. 57 [hereinafter Basel
Convention]; see Daniel Jaffe, Note & Comment, The International Effort To
Control the Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Waste: The Basel and Ba-
mako Conventions, 2 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 123, 127 (1995) ("The Basel Con-
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ministered by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP),33
defines the norm against dumping by expressly prohibiting dumping haz-
ardous waste. The Basel Convention requires in Article 4(1)(c) that parties
"shall prohibit or shall not permit the export of hazardous wastes and other
wastes if the State of import does not consent in writing to the specific im-
port, in the case where that State of import has not prohibited the import of
such wastes." The Basel Convention further requires that parties "[elnsure
the availability of adequate disposal facilities, for the environmentally sound
management of hazardous wastes and other wastes, that shall be located, to
the extent possible, within it, whatever the place of their disposal. .. ."" The
Basel Convention and the ongoing Basel Convention Secretariat-
particularly when viewed in combination with the Bamako Convention,3 5
laws adopted by many countries to implement the Basel Convention, and a
range of international accords prohibiting dumping--demonstrate that the
dumping of hazardous wastes is a violation of established international
law.36 Moreover, dumping is a tort under U.S. law.37 Therefore, aliens in-
vention's goal was to establish a global framework for the movement of haz-
ardous waste. The Basel Convention does not call for a complete ban of haz-
ardous waste exportation, rather it attempts to regulate it." (citations omit-
ted)).
33. "UNEP makes important global environmental contributions in a number of
areas. It brings scientists together to make independent assessments of envi-
ronmental problems at the global and regional levels. It catalyzes key envi-
ronmental negotiations .... It makes data available to environmental minis-
tries.... It furthers the development of international environmental law."
Elizabeth Dowdeswell & Steve Charnovitz, Globalization, Trade, and Interde-
pendence, in THINKING ECOLOGICALLY 91, 98 (Marian R. Chertow & Daniel C.
Esty eds., 1997).
34. Basel Convention art. 4.1(c), supra note 32, at 131.
35. Bamako Convention on the Ban of the Import into Africa and the Control of
Transboundary Movement and Management of Hazardous Wastes Within
Africa, Jan. 29, 1991, 21O U.N.T.S. 177 [hereinafter Bamako Convention]. The
Bamako Convention was adopted by the Organization of African Unity
(OAU) to place a total ban on the exportation of waste into Africa. See Jaffe,
supra note 32, at 131. Article 4(3)(b) provides for unlimited liability, as well as
joint and several liability, to punish violators of the Bamako Convention. See
Joseph F. St. Cyr, The International Jurisprudence and Politics of Hazardous
Substances: Managing a Global Dilemma, 12 BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 91, 11o (2004).
36. Shireen Irani Bacon, Note, Up in Smoke: The Need for International Regulation
of Hazardous Waste Incineration, 29 TEX. INT'L L.J. 257, 259 (1994) ("A hall-
mark of international concern [for the environment] is the treatment of haz-
ardous waste, as evidenced by the adoption of the Basel Convention on the
Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Dis-
posal (Basel Convention) by over one hundred countries.")
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jured by dumping can seek relief under the law of nations prong of the
ATCA.38
In order to demonstrate, first, that the anti-dumping norm is a contem-
porary iteration of the law of nations and, second, that this norm should
allow the courts solid grounds on which to recognize international envi-
ronmental law under the ATCA, this Note will proceed as follows: Part I
outlines how contemporary ATCA jurisprudence works, highlighting how a
"law of nations" norm is defined. Part II discusses how the established limi-
tations on the dumping of hazardous waste in developing nations amount
to a norm of customary international law-a law of nations. Part III exam-
ines how dumping, as a law of nations violation, could serve as a basis for
action under the ATCA. As a secondary concern, Part III identifies how
37. Hazardous waste dumping is a "toxic tort." See Rory A. Valas, Toxic Palsgraf:
Proving Causation when the Link Between Conduct and Injury Appears Highly
Extraordinary, 18 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 773, 778-79 (1991) ("A plaintiff
claiming damages for a toxic tort can attempt to bring a common law action
applying any or all of the following theories of liability: trespass, negligence,
nuisance, or strict liability. Most plaintiffs claiming personal injury from haz-
ardous wastes must attempt to prove that the defendant was negligent. To
prevail on a negligence claim, the plaintiff must prove four distinct elements.
First, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant owed a duty of due care
to the plaintiff. Second, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant breached
the duty. Third, the plaintiff must convince the factfinder that the plaintiff
suffered actual damages due to defendant's breach of duty of due care.
Fourth, the plaintiff must show that the defendant's breach was the cause of
the plaintiffs damage. Causation is the element that creates the greatest mis-
understanding among those involved in toxic tort litigation."); see also Shelly
Brinker, Opening the Door to the Indeterminate Plaintiff. An Analysis of the
Causation Barriers Facing Environmental Toxic Tort Plaintiffs, 46 UCLA L.
REV. 1289 (1999) (discussing hazardous waste dumping as a toxic tort); Clif-
ford Fisher, The Role of Causation in Science as Law and Proposed Changes in
the Current Common Law Toxic Tort System, 9 BUFF. ENVTL L.J. 35 (2001) (us-
ing hazardous waste dumping as an example of a toxic tort when discussing
the difficulty of proving causation in toxic tort litigation); c Mouton v. State,
525 So. 2d 1136, 1142 (La. Ct. App. 1988) (finding that the tortious "'conduct' of
'generator' defendants was the deposit of... wastes on plaintiffs land). See
generally Mary Elliott Roll, Unraveling Accountability: Contesting Legal and
Procedural Barriers in International Toxic Tort Cases, 15 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L.
REV. 135, 201 (2003) (arguing that "the international community should work
toward creating a new, separate and distinct forum" for litigating toxic torts).
38. See Natalie L. Bridgeman, Human Rights Litigation Under the ATCA as a
Proxy for Environmental Claims, 6 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 1, 2 (2003)
("Until environmental law is recognized as part of the 'law of nations,' as hu-
man rights law is, there can be no actionable violations of environmental law
under the ATCA.")
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certain procedural and liability concerns, commonly at issue in ATCA cases,
would be likely to play out in an anti-dumping ATCA suit. Finally, the Con-
clusion highlights how such an ATCA dumping suit could uniquely further
recovery for tort violations of international environmental law.
I. CONTEMPORARY ATCA JURISPRUDENCE: How A "LAW OF NATIONS"
NORM Is DEFINED
ATCA jurisprudence follows and responds to two central court cases-
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala39 and Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain4°-that lay out how a
"law of nations" norm is defined. Much has been written about the reemer-
gence of the ATCA in the 198os after Filartiga was decided. However, the
necessity for summarizing the three decades of jurisprudence and prolific
academic theory in Filartiga's wake was to a large extent short-circuited by
Sosa in 2004. Sosa was the second time the Supreme Court heard an ATCA
case,4 1 and it generated a great deal of academic debate, primarily among
scholars attempting to determine the scope of permissible "law of nations"
claims. 2 Ultimately, much scholarship has concluded that, while the district
courts may be inclined to be careful about extending the ATCA to new "law
of nations" claims, the courts are necessarily open to new "law of nations"
claims after Sosa.43
39. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 198o). For a history of the ATCA and efforts to apply it
to remedy environmental abuses, see Richard L. Herz, Litigating Environ-
mental Abuses Under the Alien Torts Claims Act: A Practical Assessment, 40 VA.
J. INT'L L. 545 (2000).
40. 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
41. The Supreme Court previously analyzed the ATCA in Argentine Republic v.
Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428 (1989).
42. See, e.g., Genc Trnavci, The Law of Nations Under the Alien Tort Claims Act
and the U.S. Case Law, 19 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 143, 166 (2005) ("While recog-
nizing a claim under the law of nations as an element of federal common law
as an exception to the Erie rule, the Supreme Court in Sosa was quick to em-
phasize good reasons for a restrained conception of the discretion that a fed-
eral court should exercise in considering such a new cause of action."); Gerald
Weber, The Long Road Ahead: Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain and "Clearly Estab-
lished" International Tort Law, 19 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 129, 129 (2005) ("In
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, the Supreme Court opened a trickle-gate for 'inter-
national tort' lawsuits. Many have and will speculate about the future of Alien
Tort Statute ('ATS') litigation in the wake of Sosa.").
43. See Harlan Grant Cohen, Supremacy and Diplomacy: The International Law of
the U.S. Supreme Court, 24 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 273, 286 (2006) ("ATS actions
are not limited to cases involving 'violation of safe conducts, infringement of
the rights of ambassadors, and piracy,' but any new causes of action must de-
rive from norms of international law as widely accepted and as definite in
content as those three would have been in 1789. In a sense, ATS causes of ac-
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Since in Sosa the Supreme Court favorably cites and arguably adopts Fi-
lartiga,"4 it is helpful to first identify the central language and concepts of the
Filartiga decision.4" In Filartiga, the Second Circuit held that the ATCA pro-
vides federal jurisdiction over tort suits by aliens for violations of "univer-
sally accepted norms of the international law of human rights, regardless of
the nationality of the parties."46 As authority for its position that torture
violates an accepted norm of international law, the Second Circuit cited to
the United Nations Charter, a General Assembly Resolution on torture, and
a number of conventions on human rights.4 7 The Second Circuit found the
international prohibition on torture to be "clear and unambiguous."4" Of
tion arise out of very strong, very well accepted international law."); Carolyn
A. D'Amore, Note, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain and the Alien Tort Statute: How
Wide Has the Door to Human Rights Litigation Been Left Open?, 39 AKRON L.
REV. 593, 617 (20o6) ("The Supreme Court preserved some opportunities for
future ATS claims by deciding Sosa on the basis that the alleged customary in-
ternational law that Alvarez-Machain relied upon did not achieve a standard
of universal specificity and resemblance to the 1789 version of the law of na-
tions. The slightly ajar door of the Sosa decision implicitly allowed federal
courts to determine which claims might be included in the jurisdiction of the
ATS; the plurality declined to establish a body of actionable claims with any
precision."); see also Virginia Monken Gomez, Note, The Sosa Standard: What
Does It Mean for Future ATS Litigation, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 469, 499 (2OO6) ("In
deciding Sosa, the Supreme Court had the opportunity to close the door
completely on the United States' ability to provide a forum for holding hu-
man rights abusers civilly liable, but it did not. Instead, the Court affirmed the
constitutionality of the ATS and set forth an analytical framework for ascer-
taining actionable norms under the statute.").
44. See Daniel Diskin, Note, The Historical and Modern Foundations for Aiding
and Abetting Liability Under the Alien Tort Statute, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 805, 820
(2005) (arguing that the Supreme Court adopted the Filartiga standard for
recognition of customary international law); see also Almog v. Arab Bank,
PLC, 471 F. Supp. 2d 257, 270 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (recognizing that Filartiga, "the
seminal Second Circuit [ATCA] case.., is cited repeatedly and favorably in
Sosa"); Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 456 F. Supp. 2d 457, 463
(S.D.N.Y. 2006) (discussing whether Sosa narrows or "endorses" the reason-
ing in Filartiga and concluding that the Sosa holding is so narrow that Filar-
tiga continues to be controlling law unless particularized facts run afoul of
Sosa).
45. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 731 (2004) ("The position we take
today has been assumed by some federal courts for 24 years, ever since the
Second Circuit decided Filartiga v. Pena-Irala .. " (citation omitted)).
46. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d. Cir. 198o).
47. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 883-84.
48. Id. at 884.
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additional importance, the Second Circuit held that "it is clear that courts
must interpret international law not as it was in 1789, but as it has evolved
and exists among the nations of the world today."'4 9
Twenty-four years after Filartiga, the Supreme Court in Sosa clarified
the reach of the ATCA for the first time and held that federal courts could
hear ATCA suits based on newly developed norms of international law.
Essentially, the Supreme Court adopted the reasoning set out in Filartiga,
holding: "Although we agree the statute is in terms only jurisdictional, we
think that at the time of enactment the jurisdiction enabled federal courts to
hear claims in a very limited category defined by the law of nations and
recognized at common law."" ° Any new claim under the ATCA must "rest
on a norm of international character accepted by the civilized world and
defined with a specificity comparable to the features of the 18th-century
paradigms we have recognized."5 Thus, the ATCA limits claims to those
where the law of nations is "'universal, definable, and obligatory."'5 2 The
Supreme Court recommended caution in adopting the law of nations to
private rights of action,53 but explicitly held that "the judicial power should
be exercised on the understanding that the door is still ajar subject to vigilant
doorkeeping, and thus open to a narrow class of international norms to-
day."5 4 Thereby, the Court held out the possibility for federal courts to dis-
cern newly developed norms of international law as the basis for suits under
the ATCA.55
49. Id. at 881.
50. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 712.
51. Id. at725.
52. Luciana Reali, Alvarez-Machain v. United States: How Should the Ninth Cir-
cuit Determine Which Torts Are Actionable Under the Alien Tort Claims Act?, 17
N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 51, 61 (2004) (quoting Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162,
184 (D. Mass. 1995)); see Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc. (Beanal 1), 969 F.
Supp. 362, 370 (E.D. La. 1997) ("To be recognized as an international tort un-
der § 1350, the alleged violation must be definable, obligatory (rather than
hortatory), and universally condemned.")
53. The Supreme Court recommended caution on five grounds: (1) that the "pre-
vailing conception of the common law" has changed since 1789"; (2) that
there are Erie considerations involved; (3) that the creation of a private right is
"better left to legislative judgment"; (4) that such a step has vast implications
for foreign relations; and finally, (5) that the Court has "no congressional
mandate to seek out and define new and debatable violations of the law of na-
tions." Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725-28.
54. Id. at 729 (emphasis added).
55. See Kyle Rex Jacobson, Doing Business with the Devil: The Challenges of Prose-
cuting Corporate Officials Whose Business Transactions Facilitate War Crimes
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Newly developed norms of international law, which are "specific, uni-
versal, and obligatory"5 6 so as to properly form the basis of an ATCA claim,
can be recognized on a variety of grounds. "After Sosa, it is incontrovertible
[that] jurisdiction... can be found only if the claim implicates a law of
nations norm that is as clearly defined and accepted among civilized nations
as the historical models recognized when the [ATCA] was enacted."57
Courts determine whether there is international consensus about a norm by
examining the "customs and usages of civilized nations based on widely
accepted international agreements, resolutions of international organiza-
tions, the works of jurists and commentators, United Nations documents,
and international conventions."" For example, in Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC,
the Ninth Circuit held that ratification of the United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) s9 by "at least 149 countries [was] sufficient
for it to codify customary international law that can provide the basis of an
ATCA claim."6 ° Notably, in Sarei, the Ninth Circuit held that UNCLOS
represented a codification of customary international law-a law of nations
basis for an ATCA claim-even though the United States had not ratified
UNCLOS.6" The court found that UNCLOS "[implicates] 'specific, universal
and Crimes Against Humanity, 56 A.F. L. REV. 167, 214-15 (2005). The Sosa
opinion did not specify which violations of international law norms were ac-
tionable, leading the district courts to reach quite divergent opinions, even as
to the cognizance of claims of torture and extrajudicial killings. Compare
Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, N.A., Inc., 416 F.3d 1242, 1251 (ith Cir.
2005) (holding that plaintiffs "can raise separate claims for state-sponsored
torture under the [ATCA] and also under the [TVPA]"), and Mujica v. Occi-
dental Petroleum Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1179 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (recogniz-
ing claims of torture and extrajudicial killing under ATCA), with Enahoro v.
Abubakar, 408 F.3d 877, 885 (7th Cir. 2005) (construing Sosa to limit relief
against torture and extrajudicial killing to the TVPA and dismissing plaintiffs'
torture claim brought solely under the ATCA).
56. Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1132 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
57. See Padilla-Padilla v. Gonzales, 463 F. 3d 972, 979 (9th Cir. 2006) (stating that
in order to assert a claim under the ATCA, plaintiffs should point to a "bind-
ing obligation under international law that has been violated").
58. John Alan Cohan, Environmental Rights of Indigenous Peoples Under the Alien
Tort Claims Act, the Public Trust Doctrine and Corporate Ethics, and Environ-
mental Dispute Resolution, 20 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 133, 151 (2001-02).
59. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea pt. XI, art. 21o, Dec. lo,
1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 387.
60. Sarei, 456 F.3d at 1078.
61. James Boeving argues unpersuasively that the Sosa Court rejected treaty-as-
custom arguments, such as those relied upon in Sarei. James Boeving, Half
Full... or Completely Empty?: Environmental Alien Tort Claims Post Sosa v.
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and obligatory norm [s] of international law' that properly form the basis for
ATCA claims. 6 a In order to identify customary international law, courts
"look to international instruments setting forth 'clear and unambiguous
rules,' and to other indications of widespread compliance motivated by a
sense of legal obligation, by the nations of the world."63 In Filartiga, the
Second Circuit relied upon the United Nations Charter, the Universal Dec-
laration of Human Rights, "numerous" other "international treaties and
accords," and judicial opinions.' Because the Sosa Court cited Filartiga
positively, these sources of authority continue on, at least implicitly, as per-
suasive authority for a new norm.
In Sosa, the Supreme Court chose not to formulate particular bounda-
ries and explicit requirements for what authority would qualify a norm as a
customary norm of international law. Accordingly, there are no hard and
fast rules operating in future ATCA suits on claims of newly developed cus-
tomary norms. The Sosa Court "looked to various international law sources,
including binding treaties, customary international norms, and authorita-
tive statements, such as the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law,
to determine whether there was a violation of the 'present-day law of na-
tions."6 5 Plaintiffs learn from Sosa that customary norms must be defined
with great specificity-the specificity comparable to eighteenth century
paradigms. The post-Sosa case law has yet to present a clear model of how
Alvarez-Machain, 18 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 109, 138 (2005). He relies for
this proposition on the Supreme Court's rejection of Alvarez-Machain's
claims based upon the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the
ICCPR. The Supreme Court rejected Alvarez-Machain's claims because the
authority he cited did not amount to a "rule so broad [that it] has the status
of a binding customary norm today." Sosa, 542 U.S. at 735. The Supreme
Court did not reject his reliance upon treaty-as-custom arguments; rather, the
Supreme Court indicated that such arguments are useful indicators that do
not necessarily stand alone.
62. Sarei, 456 F.3d at 1078 ("Sosa's gloss on this standard does not undermine the
district court's reasoning.")
63. Igartua-De La Rosa v. United States, 417 F.3d 145, 175-76 (1st Cir. 2005) (Tor-
ruella, J., dissenting) (arguing that the "ICCPR, the UDHR, the American
Declaration, the ACHR and the IADC are all evidence of the emergence of a
norm of customary international law with an independent and binding ju-
ridical status").
64. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 882-84 (2d Cir. 1980).
65. Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, N.A., Inc., 452 F.3d 1284, 1285 (11th Cir.
2006) (Barkett, J., dissenting); cf. United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 103 (2d
Cir. 2003) ("[W] e look primarily to the formal lawmaking and official actions
of States and only secondarily to the works of scholars as evidence of the es-
tablished practice of States.").
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one would adequately plead such specificity. 66 Still, following Filartiga, it
seems plaintiffs will need to offer a breadth of detailed and precise author-
ity.
67
II. THE INTERNATIONAL NORM AGAINST DUMPING AS A "LAW OF
NATIONS": DEFINITION AND CONSENSUS
The prohibition against dumping of hazardous wastes in developing
countries" has developed into a customary norm of international law
within the terms of ATCA jurisprudence. The anti-dumping norm is spe-
cifically defined in a widely accepted multilateral treaty.69 Moreover, this
customary international norm is buttressed by international consensus, as
demonstrated by a U.N. convention,7 ° regional conventions,7" and national
implementing legislation.72
66. The case law does indicate that "ambiguous standards" of international prac-
tice do not constitute law of nations violations. See Saperstein v. Palestinian
Auth., No. l:04-cv-20225-PAS, 2006 WL 3804718, at *8 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 22,
2006) ("This includes such unspecific conduct as 'violence to life,' 'cruel
treatment' and 'outrages upon personal dignity.' For federal courts to inter-
pret such ambiguous standards to assess its [sic] own subject matter jurisdic-
tion would pose problems for federal courts and would not meet the defined
standards of specificity that Sosa requires."); see also Mwani v. Bin Ladin, No.
CIV A 99-125 CKK, 2006 WL 3422208, at *3 (D.D.C. Sept. 28, 2006) ("[I]n or-
der for a present-day contravention of the law of nations to be more than
merely colorable, the specificity and acceptance of such violations must equal
those accepted when the ATCA was adopted in 1789.").
67. Discussing declaratory recognition of a norm based on the Filartiga standard,
Professor Osofsky argued: "This recognition ideally would take the form of
uncontroversial General Assembly Resolutions, a few regional treaties, incor-
poration by many nations, scholarly support, and some form of U.S. govern-
mental acknowledgement." Osofsky, supra note 18, at 368.
68. While there is a norm against dumping hazardous wastes, regardless of
whether the dumping occurs in a developed or developing country, the Ban
Amendment and various regional treaties, including the Bamako Convention,
emphasize the particularly egregious nature of dumping in a developing
country-elevating dumping in a developing country into a customary norm
of international law. See, e.g., Amendment to the Basel Convention, Decision
III/I, U.N. Doc. UNEP/CHW.3/35 (Nov. 28, 1995) [hereinafter Ban Amend-
ment] (in which the parties that signed the Basel Convention agreed to an
immediate ban on exporting hazardous waste from OECD to non-OECD
countries).
69. See Basel Convention, supra note 32.
70. Id.
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A. Defining the Norm Against Dumping
The Basel Convention, which deals with the transboundary movement
of hazardous waste,73 is the foremost instrument defining the norm against
hazardous waste dumping. The Basel Convention was enacted, in large part,
in response to a hazardous waste dumping crises in the 198os.14 Essentially,
the Basel Convention requires the environmentally sound disposal of haz-
ardous waste and provides a mechanism whereby states can monitor and/or
refuse thL importation of hazardous wastes. Article 9 of the Basel Conven-
tion is of primary importance to potential ATCA dumping claims, because
Article 9 deals expressly with illegal traffic in hazardous wastes.
Article 9-"Illegal Traffic"-defines illegal traffic to include "any trans-
boundary movement of hazardous wastes or other wastes... that results in
deliberate disposal (e.g., dumping) of hazardous wastes or other wastes in
contravention of this Convention and of general principles of international
law."75 Even this straightforward definition of illegal traffic recognizes that
dumping occurs in contravention of "general principles of international
law."76 Under the Convention, when an instance of the transboundary
movement of hazardous waste is determined to have been illegal traffic, the
waste must be removed by the responsible party-whether that is the ex-
porter, generator, or "State of Export."77 If the waste was dumped by the
71. See Secretariat of the Basel Convention, Article ii, http://www.basel.int/ arti-
clen/index.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2007) (providing the text of "Regional
Agreements... as Transmitted to the Secretariat").
72. See Secretariat of the Basel Convention, National Legislation, http://www.
basel.int/legalmatters/natleg/index.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2007).
73. The 1987 Cairo Guidelines and Principles for the Environmentally Sound
Management of Hazardous Wastes, a soft law instrument, "graduated into [a]
hard law" instrument in the 1989 Basel Convention. BHARAT H. DESAI, IN-
STITUTIONALIZING INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 116 (2004).
74. In the 198os, a variety of dumping scandals came to light, particularly with
regard to hazardous waste dumping in Africa. For example, between 1984 and
1986, the Soviet Union dumped several tons of radioactive waste in Benin. See
Benin Hazardous Waste, http://www.american.edu/ted/benin.htm (last vis-
ited Dec. 5, 2007). Additionally, scandals such as the "Philadelphia fly ash,"
where toxic waste was dumped in Kassa Island, Guinea, and the "Italian scan-
dal," where hazardous wastes were dumped in Koko, Nigeria, made interna-
tional news. See Cyril Uchenna Gwam, Adverse Effects of the Illicit Movement
and Dumping of Hazardous, Toxic, and Dangerous Wastes and Products on the
Enjoyment of Human Rights, 14 FLA. J. INT'L L. 427, 437 (2002).
75. Basel Convention art. 9, supra note 32, at 136-37
76. Id. art. 9.1(e), at 137.
77. Id. art. 9, at 136-37.
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importer or disposer, the "State of Import" must see to the environmentally
sound clean up and disposal of the waste.7" The Basel Convention further
provides that if responsibility for the illegal traffic cannot be assigned, then
all parties are to cooperate together to see that the waste is properly dis-
posed.79 The Basel Convention considers illegal traffic to be a crime and
encourages each party to introduce national or domestic legislation to pre-
vent and punish illegal traffic."0 Consequently, the significance of Article 9 is
to support the idea that dumping is a violation of international law.
As highlighted by the Sosa opinion, law of nations violations must be
defined with specificity. This requirement of specific definition might pre-
sent the greatest hurdle for plaintiffs if courts misconstrue definition of a
norm with definition of a scientific term within that norm. There is not
always consensus about which wastes qualify as hazardous. Even within the
European Union and the member states of the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD), definitions of "hazardous waste"
vary.8 1 Still, the Basel Convention does establish clear baseline standards for
substances that qualify as hazardous wastes.
Hazardous wastes are defined, in Article 1.1(a) of the Basel Convention,
as wastes that belong to any category contained in Annex I, unless they do
not possess any of the characteristics listed in Annex III. Annex I of the
Basel Convention lists the categories of wastes to be controlled. Annexes
VIII and IX of the Basel Convention are an elaboration and clarification of
the provisions of Article i.i(a) and provide useful clarification of the scope
of Annex 1.82
Additionally, under Article ia(b), hazardous wastes regulated by the
Basel Convention include wastes defined as or considered to be hazardous
by the states of export, import, or transit in those states' domestic legisla-
tion. So, under the Basel Convention, whether a dumped material counts as
a hazardous waste will turn on a case-by-case factual inquiry.
78. Id. art. 9.3, at 137.
79. F.O. Vicuna, Current Trends in Responsibility and Liability for Environmental
Harm, in PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT FOR THE NEW MILLENNIUM 127,
144 (Kalliopi Koufa ed., 2002) (discussing the Basel Convention's provision
for both strict liability and fault-based liability).
80. Secretariat of the Basel Convention, Illegal Traffic, http://www.basel.int/ le-
galmatters/illegtraffic/index.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2007).
81. Gwam, supra note 74, at 431.
82. Conference of the Parties to the Basel Convention on the Control of Trans-
boundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, Sixth Meet-
ing, Geneva, Switz., Dec. 9-13, 2002, Report, dec. VI/15 app. 20, at 78, 81,
U.N. Doc. UNEP/CHW.6/ 4o (Feb. 10, 2003), available at http://www.basel.int
/meetings/cop/cop6/english/Report4oe.pdf.
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Despite the potential difficulties inherent in defining what constitutes
hazardous waste, courts should not be deterred from considering the cus-
tomary international norm against dumping as a law of nations violation.
Although courts will clearly adjudicate whether a particular waste qualifies
as hazardous under case-specific facts, that adjudication should not under-
mine recognition of the international norm: whether a particular substance
is hazardous is a question of whether the international norm applies in a
given case, not a question of whether the international norm exists. The law
of nations norm encapsulated in the Basel Convention certainly does exist
and is defined with specificity: hazardous wastes should not be dumped in
contravention of international law.83
B. International Consensus Against Dumping Hazardous Waste in
Developing Countries
The Basel Convention has received broad acceptance by the interna-
tional community.8 4 Currently, there are 170 parties to the Basel Conven-
tion."5 Moreover, the Basel Convention stands with a variety of bilateral and
multilateral treaties, alongside national implementing legislation, demon-
strating the international consensus that dumping hazardous wastes in de-
veloping countries is a violation of customary international law. Together,
these instruments are indicative of international consensus.86
83. The norm that hazardous wastes should not be dumped in contravention of
international law is substantially well-defined, particularly in comparison to
claimed norms that have not met the "well-defined" threshold. See Bowoto v.
Chevron Corp., No. C 99-025o6 SI, 2o6 WL 2455752, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 22,
20o6) (noting that courts have rejected ATCA claims based on a "right to
life," "right to health," or "intranational pollution").
84. Cf Almog v. Arab Bank, PLC, 471 F. Supp. 2d 257, 271 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) ("[I]n
order for a rule to become a norm of international law, States must univer-
sally abide by or accede to it.... The question is not one of whether the rule is
often violated, but whether virtually all States recognize its validity.").
85. Secretariat of the Basel Convention, Basel Convention's Ratifications,
http://www.basel.int/ratif/convention.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2007); cf. Flo-
res v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 256 (2d Cir. 2003) ("Treaties... are
proper evidence of customary international law because, and insofar as, they
create legal obligations.., on the States parties to them."); Almog, 471 F. Supp.
2d at 273 ("Treaties ratified by at least two States provide some evidence of the
law of nations; if enough States ratify a treaty, a norm of international law
may be established. The more States that have ratified a treaty, especially
those States with greater relative influence in international affairs, the greater
the treaty's evidentiary value.").
86. In addition to being specifically defined and supported by international con-
sensus, norms of customary international law must be "obligatory." The
"obligatory" requirement means only that the norm must rest on a legal obli-
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First, since Article 9 works in concert with the Basel Convention as a
whole to prevent hazardous waste dumping, it is important to examine the
Basel Convention's overall regulatory framework. The Basel Convention
enables states to protect their citizens from dumped waste by preventing the
forced imposition of hazardous wastes on developing countries. Impor-
tantly, the Basel Convention establishes notification procedures requiring
exporting states to gain permission from the state of import prior to sending
their hazardous waste to the importing country.17 States may refuse to ac-
cept hazardous waste or choose to accept the waste subject to conditions. 8
Furthermore, the Basel Convention provides that "[elach Party shall require
that hazardous wastes or other wastes, to be exported, are managed in an
environmentally sound manner in the State of import or elsewhere."' 9 Thus,
both the exporter and importer of waste are responsible for its environmen-
tally sound disposal. That the Basel Convention mandates such joint re-
sponsibility clearly indicates the importance of safe, legal disposal of waste
to the international community, as no state is able to send its waste off to
travel the oceanic abyss and simply shrug its shoulders. Likewise, the Basel
Convention requires that the transboundary movement of "hazardous
wastes and other wastes is reduced to the minimum consistent with the
environmentally sound and efficient management of such wastes, and is
conducted in a manner which will protect human health and the environ-
ment against the adverse effects which may result from such movement." 90
Overall, the Basel Convention's aspiration is to minimize the transboundary
movement of waste.9' Under the terms of this multilateral convention, pre-
venting illegal traffic is a baseline requirement.
gation, rather than on general moral or political grounds. See Weiss v. Am.
Jewish Comm., 335 F. Supp. 2d 469, 476 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); see also In re S. Afri-
can Apartheid Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 538, 552 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (holding that
customary international law norms must be based on "binding international
law"). The breadth of treaties and national implementing legislation demon-
strate that the norm against dumping has been enacted into law.
87. Basel Convention art. 6, supra note 32, at 134-36.
88. Id. art. 6.2, at 134.
89. Id. art. 4.8.
90. Id. art. 4 .2(d).
91. See Secretariat of the Basel Convention, Short Description of the Basel Con-
vention, http://www.basel.int/convention/sdescription.html (last visited Oct.
15, 2007) ("Parties are expected to minimize the quantities that are moved
across borders, to treat and dispose of wastes as close as possible to their place
of generation and to prevent or minimize the generation of wastes at
source.").
YALE LAW & POLICY REVIEW
The Secretariat of the Basel Convention, administered by UNEP, recog-
nizes that effective implementation of the Convention rests in part on the
enactment of national legislation to "implement and enforce" the Conven-
tion.92 Article 4.4 of the Basel Convention provides that: "Each Party shall
take appropriate legal, administrative and other measures to implement and
enforce the provisions of this Convention, including measures to prevent
and punish conduct in contravention of the Convention."93 Consequently,
many of the parties-at least one hundred countries94 -have enacted na-
tional legislation implementing the Basel Convention.
This implementing legislation often goes beyond the requirements of
the Basel Convention, strengthening the country's ability to prevent illegal
traffic within its borders. For example, the Republic of Albania has prohib-
ited the importation of all hazardous wastes.95 Brazil passed legislation to
92. Secretariat of the Basel Convention, National Legislation, http://www.basel.
int/legalmatters/natleg/index.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2007).
93. Basel Convention art. 4.4, supra note 32, at 132.
94. Countries enacting implementing legislation include Albania, Andorra, Ar-
gentina, Armenia, Austria, Australia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Bela-
rus, Belgium, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil,
Bulgaria, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croa-
tia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic,
Ecuador, Egypt, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany,
Greece, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Ja-
pan, Jordan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lichtenstein, Lithuania, Luxemburg,
Macedonia, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia,
Moldova, Monaco, Morocco, Mozambique, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nica-
ragua, Norway, Pakistan, Paraguay, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania,
Russian Federation, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Saudi Arabia, Senegal,
Seychelles, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sudan, Sweden,
Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Tunisia, Uganda, United King-
dom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania,
Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, and Zambia. See Secretariat of the Basel Con-
vention, National Legislation, http://www.basel.int/legalmatters/natleg/by-
parties/frsetmain.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2007).
95. A copy of a decision of the Albanian Counsel of Ministers that "prohibit[s]
the importation into the Republic of Albania of hazardous waste" can be
found on the website of the Secretariat of the Basel Convention at
http://www.basel.int/legalmatters/natleg/albania3.doc (last visited Dec. 7,
2007).
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control and, in many cases, prohibit the importation of hazardous wastes.96
Zambia has prohibited dumping into the aquatic environment.97
In 1993, the European Community adopted Directive 259/93 implement-
ing the Basel Convention.9" Subsequently, the European Union adopted
Regulation 120/97, 9 which implements the Ban Amendment to the Basel
Convention. The Ban Amendment "bans hazardous wastes exports for final
disposal and recycling from what are known as Annex VII countries (Basel
Convention Parties that are members of the EU, OECD, and Liechtenstein)
to non-Annex VII countries (all other Parties to the Convention).""1 ° The
Amendment recognizes "that transboundary movements of hazardous
wastes, especially to developing countries, have a high risk of not constitut-
ing an environmentally sound management of hazardous wastes."' 0 '
Additionally, the Basel Convention has catalyzed regional agreements
regulating the transboundary movement of hazardous wastes. Regional
agreements further demonstrate the international consensus that, without
regulation, hazardous waste may well be disposed of in a dangerous and
damaging manner. These regional agreements include the Waigani Conven-
tion,10 2 the Agreement of the Commonwealth of Independent States on the
Monitoring of Transboundary Shipments of Hazardous and Other
96. A copy of the relevant Brazilian resolution can be found on the website of the
Secretariat of the Basel Convention at http://www.basel.int/legalmatters/ nat-
leg/brazil3.doc (last visited Dec. 7, 2007).
97. A copy of the relevant Zambian act can be found on the website of the Secre-
tariat of the Basel Convention at http://www.basel.int/legalmatters/natleg/
zambiaol.pdf (last visited Dec. 7, 2007).
98. Council Regulation 259/93, 1993 O.J. (L 30) 1 (EC), available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31993Ro259:EN:HTML.
99. Council Regulation 120/97, 1997 O.J. (L 22) 14-15 (EU), available at
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/index.htm.
100. Ban Amendment, supra note 68.
101. Id.
102. Convention To Ban the Importation into Forum Island Countries of Hazard-
ous and Radioactive Wastes and To Control the Transboundary Movements
of Hazardous Wastes Within the South Pacific Region, Oct. 21, 2001, 2161
U.N.T.S. 91 [hereinafter Waigani Convention]. The Waigani Convention cov-
ers the area including American Samoa, Australia, Cook Islands, Federated
States of Micronesia, Fiji, French Polynesia, Guam, Kiribati, Republic of the
Marshall Islands, Nauru, New Caledonia and Dependencies, New Zealand,
Niue, the Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands, Republic of Palau,
Papua New Guinea. Pitcairn Islands, Solomon Islands, Tokelau, Tonga, Tu-
valu, Vanuatu, Wallis and Futuna, and Western Samoa. Id. art. 1, at 95.
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Wastes, °3 the Convention on the Protection of the Environment Through
Criminal Law, 10 4 and the Bamako Convention.'
The Waigani Convention, which was adopted in 1995, notes "with con-
cern that a number of approaches have been made to certain Island Coun-
tries of the South Pacific by unscrupulous foreign waste dealers for the im-
portation into and the disposal within the South Pacific of hazardous wastes
generated in other countries." 106 The Waigani Convention provides that
"[e]ach Pacific Island Developing Party shall take appropriate legal, admin-
istrative and other measures within the area under its jurisdiction to ban the
import of all hazardous wastes and radioactive wastes from outside the
Convention Area. Such import shall be deemed an illegal and criminal
act ... . ""' The Convention clearly establishes that the South Pacific accords
with international consensus against the dumping of hazardous waste.
Multilateral agreements in Asia and Europe further emphasize interna-
tional consensus against dumping. For example, the Agreement of the
Commonwealth of Independent States on the Monitoring of Transbound-
ary Shipments of Hazardous and Other Wastes is a multilateral implement-
ing agreement between the CIS countries: Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus,
Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmeni-
stan, Uzbekistan, and Ukraine.' "Under this [Aigreement, the parties will
take measures to regulate the import of wastes into their territory and the
transit of hazardous and other wastes through their territory."'0 9 The
103. Agreement of the Commonwealth of Independent States on the Monitoring
of Transboundary Shipments of Hazardous and Other Wastes, Dec. 16, 1999,
REPORT OF THE 10TH SESSION OF THE INT'L ECOLOGICAL CONGRESS 59. The




104. Commission to the Council of European States, Convention on the Protec-
tion of the Environment Through Criminal Law, opened for signature Apr. 11,
1998, 172 C.E.T.S., available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/
Html/172.htm [hereinafter Protection of the Environment]. This Convention
has not yet entered into force, as only thirteen countries are signatories, and
only Estonia has ratified the Convention.
105. Bamako Convention, supra note 35.
106. Waigani Convention Preamble, supra note 102, at 93.
107. Id. art. 4, para. i(a), at 98.
108. Agreement, supra note 103.
109. Natural Resource Aspects of Sustainable Development in the Republic of
Uzbekistan, http://www.un.org/esa/agenda21/natlinfo/countr/uzbek/nature.
htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2007).
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Agreement also establishes a regional center to facilitate study and technol-
ogy transfers related to the regulation of waste traffic."' The Council of
Europe provides yet another example of consensus against dumping. The
Convention on the Protection of the Environment Through Criminal Law,
a convention of the Council of Europe, allows for parties to establish crimi-
nal or administrative offenses for the unlawful disposal of hazardous
wastes."' Under the Convention:
Each Party shall adopt such appropriate measures as may be neces-
sary to establish as criminal offences under its domestic law.., the
unlawful disposal, treatment, storage, transport, export or import of
hazardous waste which causes or is likely to cause death or serious
injury to any person or substantial damage to the quality of air, soil,
water, animals or plants.., when committed intentionally. 1
2
The Convention also provides for parties to adopt criminal sanctions for
negligent acts of dumping." 3 Moreover, the Convention states that corpora-
tions may be held both civilly and criminally liable for unlawful dumping.' 4
The Bamako Convention"' is particularly compelling authority for the
international norm prohibiting the dumping of hazardous waste. Since "the
African nations lack the technical expertise and the administrative capabili-
ties to monitor, detect, or handle hazardous waste. . . they are susceptible to
illegal dumping." "'16 The Bamako Convention parallels the Basel Convention
by addressing illegal traffic in its own Article 9, adopting and therefore reaf-
firming the Basel Convention language. The Bamako Convention prohibits
"the import of all hazardous wastes, for any reason, into Africa from non-
Contracting Parties. Such import shall be deemed illegal and a criminal
act."" 7 The Bamako Convention clearly goes beyond the purview and re-
strictions outlined in the Basel Convention by placing a ban on the importa-
tion of hazardous waste into Africa. Here the parties want so deeply to pro-
tect their citizens from dumping that they prohibit importation by non-
contracting parties all together. Moreover, the Bamako Convention imposes
110. UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, Rio
de Janeiro, 1992, Johannesburg Summit 2002: Russian Federation Country Pro-
file 38, available at http://www.un.org/esa/agenda21/natlinfo/wssd/Russian
fed.pdf.
111. Protection of the Environment, art. 4(c), supra note 104.
112. Id. art. 2, para. i(c).
113. Id. art. 3.
114. Id. art. 9.
115. Bamako Convention, supra note 35.
116. Jaffe, supra note 32, at 130.
117. Bamako Convention, supra note 35, art. 4, para. 1.
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strict joint and several liability on the generators of hazardous waste who
violate the Convention's terms.'
Various conventions prohibiting dumping at sea provide further evi-
dence that the prohibition on dumping is supported by international con-
sensus, elevating the prohibition into a law of nations. For example, parties
to the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of
Wastes and Other Matter (London Convention 1972) pledged "to take all
practicable steps to prevent the pollution of the sea by the dumping of
waste."" 9 The 1996 Protocol to the London Convention 1972 prohibits
dumping waste at sea.' 20 There are 81 parties to the London Convention,
including the United States, and 30 parties to the 1996 Protocol. The Kuwait
Regional Convention for Cooperation on the Protection of the Marine En-
vironment from Pollution, to which Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman,
Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are parties, prohibits the
dumping of hazardous wastes from ships or airplanes into the sea.' 2'
UNCLOS Part XI, Article 21o requires that "States shall adopt laws and
regulations to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine envi-
ronment by dumping." 12 As of March 5, 2007, 155 countries had ratified
Part XI of UNCLOS.
123
As previously discussed, in Sarei, the Ninth Circuit found that UNCLOS
codified customary international law to form the basis of an ATCA claim.'24
The United States is not a party to UNCLOS, and as such, the Ninth Cir-
cuit's holding that an UNCLOS claim could be adjudicated under the ATCA
is particularly strong support for a hazardous waste dumping claim. Fur-
thermore, although the United States has not ratified the Basel Convention,
118. Kimberly K. Gregory, The Basel Convention and the International Trade of
Hazardous Waste: The Road to the Destruction of Public Health and the Envi-
ronment Is Paved with Good Intentions, 1O CURRENTS: INT'L TRADE L.J. 80, 82
(2001).
119. Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes
and Other Matter art. 1, 1972, 104 U.N.T.S. 120.
120. 1996 Protocol to the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by
Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter art. 4, Nov. 7, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 1 (1997).
121. Kuwait Regional Convention for Co-operation on the Protection of the Ma-
rine Environment from Pollution art. 5, http://www.basel.int/articleu/ in-
dex.html.
122. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 59, at 387.
123. Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Office of Legal Affairs,
United Nations, The Convention and Agreements, http://www.un.org/Depts/
los/convention-agreements/convention-agreements.htm (last visited Dec. io,
2007).
124. Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 456 F.3d 1069, 1078 (9 th Cir. 2006).
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the United States need not do so for the Basel Convention to set out a norm
of customary international law. While it is of course true that dumping at
sea and the illegal traffic into and dumping within a developing country are
not identical violations of international law, prohibitions on dumping at sea
emphasize international consensus that waste should be disposed of in an
environmentally sound manner.
Bilateral and multilateral treaties combine with multitudinous domestic
legislation to demonstrate the international consensus against the dumping
of hazardous waste. The international consensus against dumping hazard-
ous waste in developing countries is particularly strong.'25 This international
consensus develops the norm against dumping into a customary norm of
international law. As stated in Filartiga, "It is only where the nations of the
world have demonstrated that the wrong is of mutual, and not merely sev-
eral, concern, by means of express international accords, that a wrong gen-
erally recognized becomes an international law violation within the meaning
of the [ATCA]."' 26 The customary international norm against dumping
should qualify as a law of nations violation within the meaning of the
ATCA.
III. PROHIBITION ON DUMPING AS A LAW OF NATIONS VIOLATION
ACTIONABLE UNDER THE ATCA
Dumping in violation of international law is a law of nations violation
that can serve as a basis for claim under the ATCA. There are three elements
to an ATCA claim. The ATCA provides federal district courts original juris-
diction over (i) "any civil action by an alien" (2) "for a tort only" that is (3)
"committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United
States." '127 This Note assumes that victims of dumping in developing nations
would be "aliens" and, as previously discussed, that dumping is a cognizable
"tort." Plaintiffs cannot pursue claims under the "treaty" prong of the
ATCA because the Basel Convention is not self-executing and lacks author-
izing legislation in the United States. 28 However, the Basel Convention does
125. See, e.g., Bamako Convention, supra note 35.
126. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 888 (2d Cir. 198o).
127. Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA), 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
128. As discussed in Greenpeace USA v. Stone:
In the absence of authorizing legislation, an individual may enforce a
treaty's provisions only when it is self-executing, that is, when it ex-
pressly or impliedly provides a private right of action .... The Basel
Convention has no implementing legislation and is not self-
executing. This court has no standards or procedures to judicially
enforce the treaty and therefore, plaintiffs' claim under the Basel
Convention must fail.
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not need authorizing legislation to serve as the cornerstone of the anti-
dumping law of nations. The Basel Convention stands in concert with other
treaties and with domestic legislation, demonstrating the international con-
sensus that dumping is a violation of "the law of nations."
A. Dumping, as a Law of Nations Violation, Comports with Sosa
The Sosa opinion indicates that newly developed law of nations viola-
tions will have to be defined with specificity comparable to eighteenth-
century paradigms. 129 As stated in Sosa, as originally drafted, the ATCA
applied to "a sphere in which... rules binding individuals for the benefit of
other individuals overlapped with the norms of state relationships ....
[Tjhis narrow set of violations of the law of nations, admitting of a judicial
remedy and at the same time threatening serious consequences in interna-
tional affairs[, was] probably on minds of the men who drafted the ATS
with its reference to tort." 3' The international dumping of hazardous
wastes, while a contemporary issue, falls squarely within that "narrow set of
violations," as it both admits of a judicial remedy and certainly threatens
serious consequences for international affairs.
Evidence that hazardous waste dumping admits of a judicial remedy is
two-fold. First, the Basel Convention outlines a process through which
states can adjudicate violations of the Convention. 3' The Basel Convention
limits state remedies to a removal of dumped materials by the violating
state. As previously stated, the Basel Convention does not address tort
remedies for private individuals. However, that the Convention anticipates
adjudication for state redress indicates that dumping violations are amena-
ble to inquiry and disposition in a court of law. Moreover, allegations of
dumping have lead to criminal prosecution in the past.1 32 Still, while state
remedies and criminal prosecution may succeed in removing the hazardous
waste and may also serve as deterrents, these remedies in and of themselves
do little to assist the victims of illegal dumping.
748 F. Supp. 749, 767 (D. Haw. 1990).
129. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 761-62 (2004).
130. ATS stands for "Mien Tort Statute," which is another term for the Alien Tort
Claims Act. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 715.
131. Basel Convention Annex VI, supra note 32, at 16o.
132. See United States of America v. Stickle, 454 F.3d 1265, 1267 (ith Cir. 2006)
(affirming conviction for "knowingly discharging an oily mixture into the sea
without an oil discharge monitoring system"); see also Gail Edmondson &
Kate Carlisle, Italy and the Eco-Mafia: How Billions Are Made Through Dump-
ing Toxic Waste with Little Public Outcry, Bus. WK., Jan. 27, 2003, at 24 (de-
scribing the Greenland/Ecoverde hazardous waste dumping prosecution in It-
aly).
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These victims suffer the types of medical and emotional damages that
U.S. courts are accustomed to addressing.' The U.S. judiciary is quite ca-
pable of handling tort claims arising from dumping.' Adjudicating viola-
tions of the customary international norm against dumping would fall
squarely within the expertise of U.S. courts.
As to Sosa's recognition that, when the ATCA was enacted, violations of
the law of nations threatened serious consequences in international affairs,
one need look no further than the C6te d'Ivoire crisis to see that dumping
threatens such consequences. In C6te d'Ivoire, dumping precipitated rioting
in the streets and a virtual collapse of the government. While it is true that
the government was to a large extent reinstated, in developing countries
with transitional governments-the countries most likely to be victimized
by transboundary dumping-government upset may threaten a quick slide
back into national unrest, with regional consequences.
When faced with such great environmental harm and its pursuant hu-
man health crisis, transitional governments in developing countries like
C6te d'Ivoire lack the institutional resources to finance medical care and the
clean-up of hazardous waste. For example, in the recent C6te d'Ivoire crisis,
the Ivorian government contracted with French authorities to collect the
hazardous materials and oversee their clean up and eventual incineration.
However, the Ivorian government was simply unable to afford these envi-
ronmental services. On December 14, 2006 UNEP called upon the interna-
tional community to provide financial assistance for the cleanup and estab-
lished a special Trust Fund. The Fund was designed to fast track donations
to C6te d'Ivoire to prevent "people of one of the world's poorest countries
[from] being forced to pay the bill for removal and clean up operations."'3
133. See, e.g., Gregory M. Romano, Note, "Shovels First and Lawyers Later": A
Collision Course for CERCLA Cleanups and Environmental Tort Claims, 21
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 421, 428 (1997) ("Examples of large scale
settlements of environmental tort claims stemming from hazardous waste ul-
timately cleaned up under CERCLA include tort suits for medical and eco-
nomic harm by 280 residents in the 'Three Mile Island' nuclear disaster, a $20
million 'Love Canal' settlement for 1,300 former and current residents, and a
$400,000 settlement for a Chevron McColl dumping site to seventy-eight
families in Fullerton, California.").
134. See, e.g., Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 862 F.2d 910 (1st Cir. 1988); Plaza Speed-
way, Inc. v. United States, No. 97-1346, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25017 (D. Kan.
Apr. 12, 2001); Badalamenti v. Chevron Chem. Co., Civ. A. No. 94-1420, 1995
WL 386868 (E.D. La. June 27, 1995); ef. New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 473,
473-74 (1931) ("Obstruction of navigation of fishing and other boats, and inju-
ries to fishing rights and fish nets, due to the dumping of garbage in the ocean
by the defendant, are maritime torts.").
135. Press Release, U.N. Env't Programme, Donor Assistance Critical to C6te
D'Ivoire Clean-up Efforts (Dec. 20, 2006), available at http://www.unep.org/
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Accordingly, waste dumping threatens both violence with implications for
the international community and international financial repercussions. The
customary international norm against hazardous waste dumping thus quali-
fies under both Sosa criteria.
Furthermore, there is a poetic symmetry in highlighting dumping viola-
tions for cognizance and remedy under the ATCA. Blackstone identified
violations of safe conducts, 13 6 infringements of the rights of ambassadors,
and piracy as three violations of the law of nations addressed by the criminal
law of England.137 Piracy and, to a degree, the rights of ambassadors deal
with shipboard crimes. Since hazardous waste is often transported via ship
to its dumping ground,13 this tortious behavior presents itself as a modern
day corollary to eighteenth century violations of the law of nations.
B. Procedural and Liability Issues Particular to the ATCA
Of particular importance, ATCA claims are frequently dismissed by the
district courts on discretionary grounds. ATCA claims must survive consid-
eration of "international comity," the "recognition which one nation allows
within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another
nation." 39 Essentially, when a court is considering whether to dismiss a
claim on the grounds of international comity, the court considers whether
there is an acceptable forum in the foreign country in which the plaintiffs




136. For a discussion of safe conducts, see Taveras v. Taveraz, 477 F.3d 767, 772-76
(6th Cir. 2007).
137. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *68.
138. See Maria A. Mazzocchi, Note, Amlon Metals, Inc. v. FMC Corp.: U.S. Courts'
Denial of International Environmental Responsibility, 9 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J.
155, 156 (1997) (discussing the infamous Khian Sea ship's dumping of toxic in-
cinerator ash); Lillian M. Pinzon, Note, Criminalization of the Transboundary
Movement of Hazardous Waste and the Effect on Corporations, 7 DEPAUL Bus.
L.J. 173, 175 (1994) (discussing the case of the barge Mobro 4,000, in which a
ship left New York, sailed over 6,ooo miles, and, unable to find a port that
would accept its waste, returned to New York).
139. Jota v. Texaco Inc., 157 F.3d 153, 159 (2d Cir. 1998) (internal citations omitted).
140. Jennifer L. Heil, Comment, African Private Security Companies and the Alien
Tort Claims Act: Could Multinational Oil and Mining Companies Be Liable?, 22
Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 291, 304 (2002).
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ATCA claims must also survive motions to dismiss for forum non con-
veniens and the political question doctrine.'4 ' These issues are faced by all
plaintiffs bringing ATCA claims. Unfortunately, "it remains unclear how
often federal courts will burden" ATCA claims with "discretionary judicial
doctrines." '42
Courts may also dismiss an ATCA claim for lack of standing. Plaintiffs
with environmental claims may face particular difficulty with standing. The
deleterious effects of noncompliance with international environmental trea-
ties like the Montreal Protocol 43 or the Convention on Climate Change
may be born by the world's population as a whole. This universality makes
it difficult for plaintiffs to demonstrate standing to sue. However, unlike
noncompliance with the Montreal Protocol, noncompliance with the Basel
Convention harms individual tort plaintiffs in a personal and demonstrable
manner. Thus, on at least one procedural front, plaintiffs in dumping suits
stand a better chance of admission into U.S. courts than plaintiffs in other
areas of international environmental law. 141
In addition to procedural concerns, ATCA plaintiffs must work through
issues of liability. Plaintiffs may, and likely will, wish to bring claims against
corporations responsible for dumping, rather than limiting their suits to
claims against state actors. The Basel Convention itself does not provide a
private right of action against companies violating the treaty. Under the
terms of the Basel Convention, exporting parties who violate the Conven-
tion are liable for the removal of dumped wastes, rather than for private
party tort claims. Article 9 states that wastes are to be "taken back ... or
otherwise disposed of in accordance with the provisions of this Conven-
141. Boeving, supra note 61, at 128 ("Instead, because of the nature of ATS claims,
courts typically dismiss on discretionary grounds, such as forum non conven-
iens, international comity, the political question doctrine, or the act of state
doctrine."); see also Elizabeth Barrett Ristroph, How Can the United States
Correct Multinational Corporations' Environmental Abuses Committed in the
Name of Trade?, 15 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 51, 81 (2004) ("Courts have
some discretion to accept cases involving foreign plaintiffs and domestic de-
fendants. However, they have tended to dismiss such cases on bases of forum
non conveniens, failure to join indispensable parties, or lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.").
142. John Haberstroh, Note & Comment, In re World War II Era Japanese Forced
Labor Litigation and Obstacles to International Human Rights Claims in U.S.
Courts, lo ASIAN L.J. 253, 265 (2003).
143. Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 2987,
2297 U.N.T.S. 179.
144. For a survey of standing rulings in international environmental law, see Carl
Bruch, Is International Environmental Law Really "Law"?: An Analysis of Ap-
plication in Domestic Courts, 23 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 423, 448-51 (2006).
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tion."' 45 The Basel Convention also outlines procedures for dispute resolu-
tion between states. Article 20 provides that parties "shall seek a settlement
of the dispute through negotiation or any other peaceful means of their own
choice." 146 When parties cannot settle their dispute through negotiation,
Article 20 outlines procedures for arbitration.' Again, this Note does not
argue that the Basel Convention itself authorizes tort suits, but rather that
the Basel Convention, when considered alongside other textual sources of
international law, evidences a developed "law of nations" under which the
illegal dumping of hazardous waste violates international norms. As stated
in Sosa, "it is correct ... to assume that the First Congress understood that
the district courts would recognize private causes of action for certain torts
in violation of the law of nations."14 The ATCA allows U.S. courts to pro-
vide a private right of action for law of nations violations.149
Whether private parties may be held directly liable or held liable under
aiding and abetting or secondary liability claims in an ATCA suit remains an
issue. 5° Basically, the argument for private party liability is twofold. First,
private parties, including corporations, are capable of violating international
law. ' Although historically only states were liable under international law,
145. Basel Convention art. 9.2(a)-(b), supra note 32, at 137.
146. Id. art. 20.1, at 145.
147. Id. art. 20.2, at 145-46.
148. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724 (2004).
149. See Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 847 (ith Cir. 1996); Kadic v. Karadzic,
7o F.3d 232, 238 (2d Cir. 1995); In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human
Rights Litigation, 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630
F.2d 876, 887 (2d Cir. 198o); cf David D. Christensen, Note, Corporate Liabil-
ity for Overseas Human Rights Abuses: The Alien Tort Statute After Sosa v. Al-
varez-Machain, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1219, 1223 (2005) ("[S]ince World
War II, international law has clearly recognized the liability of nonstate actors.
Although corporations, like private individuals, do not have equal status with
states on the international plane, they still have international duties and re-
sponsibilities." (citation omitted)).
150. See Anastasia Khokhryakova, Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc.: Liability of a
Private Actor for an International Environmental Tort Under the Alien Tort
Claims Act, 9 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 463, 482-84 (1998); Courtney
Shaw, Uncertain Justice: Liability of Multinationals Under the Alien Tort Claims
Act, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1359 (2002) (discussing standards for private party liabil-
ity in the context of Doe v. Unocal Corp., 110 F. Supp. 2d 1294 (C.D. Cal.
2000)).
151. See Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc. (Presbyterian
Church I), 244 F. Supp. 2d 289, 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) ("While the Second Cir-
cuit has not explicitly held that corporations are potentially liable for viola-
tions of the law of nations, it has considered numerous cases, as noted above,
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customary international law has evolved to hold private parties liable for
"violations of the most serious international norms."' Second, private
parties may be held liable for aiding and abetting government actors 53 or
government activity in violation of international law.5 4 Private parties may
also be held liable for acting under color of governmental authority. 55 In
Kadic v. Karadzic, the Second Circuit held that "[wie do not agree that the
law of nations, as understood in the modern era, confines its reach to state
action. Instead, we hold that certain forms of conduct violate the law of
nations whether undertaken by those acting under the auspices of a state or
only as private individuals." ' 6 Private party liability was not a component of
the Sosa case, and so the Supreme Court touched on the issue only in
dicta. 5 7 Still, in the years since Sosa, the district courts have, to a large ex-
where a plaintiff sued a corporation under the ATCA for alleged breaches of
international law: Iota, Wiwa, Bigio, and Aguinda. In each of these cases, the
Second Circuit acknowledged that corporations are potentially liable for vio-
lations of the law of nations that ordinarily entail individual responsibility, in-
cluding jus cogens violations.").
152. Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., No. C 99-02506 SI, 2006 WL 2455752, at *2 (N.D.
Cal. Aug. 22, 20o6).
153. Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc. (Presbyterian Church
11), 453 F. Supp. 2d 633, 668 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) ("Aiding and abetting liability is a
specifically defined norm of international character that is properly applied as
the law of nations for purposes of the [ATCA].... To show that a defendant
aided and abetted a violation of international law, an [ATCA] plaintiff must
show: (1) that the principal violated international law; (2) that the defendant
knew of the specific violation; (3) that the defendant acted with the intent to
assist that violation, that is, the defendant specifically directed his acts to assist
in the specific violation; (4) that the defendant's acts had a substantial effect
upon the success of the criminal venture; and (5) that the defendant was
aware that the acts assisted the specific violation.").
154. Presbyterian Church I, 244 F. Supp. 2d. 289; see also Steven R. Ratner, Corpora-
tions and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility, III YALE L.J. 443, 480
(2001) (citing the Basel Convention as a treaty that imposes an "international
standard of liability on the corporation"). Contra In re S. African Apartheid
Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 538 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
155. See Doe v. Saravia, 348 F. Supp. 2d 1112, 1150 (E.D. Cal. 2004); Wiwa v. Royal
Dutch Petroleum Co., No. 96 Civ. 8386(KMW), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3293, at
*13 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2002). Standards may require that the plaintiff show
"some government involvement." Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 245 (2d. Cir.
1995).
156. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 239.
157. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 n.20 (2004) ("A related considera-
tion is whether international law extends the scope of liability for a violation
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tent, held that private parties, and corporations in particular,' can be held
liable under the ATCA.'
5 9
Courts should be wary of potential defenses that the producers and
transporters of hazardous waste are not liable for breach of anti-dumping
norms because they merely sold their waste to a foreign company and are
not responsible for actions by that foreign company. Companies producing
and transporting waste may attempt to rely on Corrie v. Caterpillar, Inc.,
which held that the Caterpillar bulldozer company could not be held liable
for merely selling products to a foreign government. 6 ° Under Caterpillar,
merely selling a product to a foreign government does not make a company
liable for violations of international law by that foreign government. How-
ever, it would be a mistake to strictly apply the Caterpillar rule to claims for
the tortious dumping of hazardous waste in a developing country, because
the transboundary movement of hazardous waste is a strictly regulated en-
terprise under international law and is simply not analogous to the interna-
tional sale of tractors. Courts will need to make a careful case-by-case de-
termination of the facts. The customary international norms of anti-
dumping law require that a state be notified of the import of hazardous
waste and officially accept that waste. Companies producing and transport-
ing waste should not be allowed to escape liability by failing to notify the
proper authorities within the importing country and then selling their waste
to a (possibly fictitious) company to be quickly disposed. Unless companies
selling hazardous waste into a developing country follow the norms of in-
ternational waste exportation, those companies should be held liable for any
subsequent dumping of their waste, as the company knew or should have
known that the waste could have been disposed of improperly.
of a given norm to the perpetrator being sued, if the defendant is a private ac-
tor such as a corporation or individual.")
158. See Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., No. C 99-02506 SI, 2006 WL 2455752, at *9
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2006) ("Both before and after Sosa, courts have concluded
that corporations may be held liable under the ATS.").
159. For a discussion of private party liability under the ATCA, see Bowoto, 2006
WL 2455752 (noting that aiding and abetting liability is generally appropriate
under international law but refusing to expand American color-of-law juris-
prudence into the ATCA context). See also Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 456 F.3d
lo69, 1078 (9th Cir. 2006) (noting that "claims for vicarious liability for viola-
tions of jus cogens norms are actionable under the ATCA.").
160. 403 F. Supp. 2d o19 (W.D. Wash. 2005). The claims in Caterpillar under the
ATCA were dismissed because the plaintiff was not an alien. Id. at 1026.
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It is worth noting that, as the United States is merely a signatory' 6' of
the Basel Convention and has not ratified the treaty, as previously discussed,
the "treaties" prong of the ATCA does not apply.'62 Somewhat ironically, for
this particular application, non-ratification of the Basel Convention works
in the environmentalists' favor. Under the treaty clause, aliens alleging torts
may only bring suit against U.S. defendants, as it would be illogical to hold a
foreign defendant in violation of a U.S. treaty.'63 Since the United States has
not ratified the Basel Convention, the restrictions of the treaty clause are
inapplicable. Under the law of nations prong, alien tort claimants may bring
suit against foreign defendants.'"6 Although U.S. courts would still be re-
quired to have personal jurisdiction over such a defendant, suit under the
"law of nations" prong increases the probability that victims will be com-
pensated.
CONCLUSION
Recognition of dumping as a violation of the law of nations cognizable
under the ATCA is particularly important now, as stricter domestic envi-
ronmental laws are resulting in an increased traffic in hazardous waste. 6 ' As
the development of a global market continues "and tough domestic controls
raise the costs of hazardous wastes disposal in developed countries, the op-
portunities and incentives for illegal trafficking of wastes will continue to
grow."' 66 While the customary international law prohibition against dump-
ing includes dumping in developed countries, developing countries are par-
ticularly at risk, as they often lack the technical expertise to handle hazard-
161. Cf Mansour v. Ashcroft, 390 F.3d 667, 681 n.o (9th Cir. 2004) (Pregerson, J.,
dissenting) (noting that, because the United States signed the 1989 Conven-
tion on the Rights of the Child, it is "obliged under international treaty law to
refrain from acts which would defeat the objectives and purpose of the Con-
vention"). Similarly, since the United States has signed the Basel Convention,
the United States is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat its objec-
tives.
162. Boeving, supra note 61, at 136 ("[C]laims under treaties are limited to those
which are specific and self-executing or incorporated in the United States
through domestic implementing legislation.").
163. Carpenter, supra note 27, at 38, 46.
164. Id.
165. Pierre Portas, The Basel Convention, Back to the Future, 6 SUSTAINABLE DEV.
L. & POL'Y, Spring 2006, at 38 (2006).
166. Press Release, U.N. Env't Programme, Update on the Abidjan Hazardous
Wastes Crisis (Sept. 12, 20o6), available at http://www.unep.org/Documents.
Multilingual/Default.asp?DocumentlD=487&ArticlelD=5347&l=en (quoting
UNEP Executive Director Achim Steiner).
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OUS waste. 167 Dumping hazardous waste in a developing country is a "shock-
ingly egregious" violation of customary international law and comes within
the cognizance of the ATCA. 
16
1
This Note has argued for pursuing the dumping of hazardous waste as a
law of nations violation under the ATCA. The international norm against
dumping is specifically defined and supported by international consensus
such that the norm is a law of nations cognizable under the ATCA. ATCA
suits should allow individuals victimized by dumping the relief that is oth-
erwise unavailable in their home nation's courts. Moreover, allowing vic-
tims to recover from corporations and state actors should help deter future
dumping-with positive effects both for the environment and in the realm
of public health. Finally, the law of nations norm against dumping in devel-
oping countries is uniquely situated within international environmental law.
The anti-dumping norm is specifically defined and benefits from interna-
tional consensus-giving the norm against dumping a chance to succeed
where previous ATCA environmental claims have come up short.
167. Mary Critharis, Note, Third World Nations Are Down in the Dumps: The Ex-
portation of Hazardous Waste, 16 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 311, 312 (1990).
168. Zapata v. Quinn, 707 F.2d 691, 692 (2d. Cir. 1983) (stating that the ATCA
"applies only to shockingly egregious violations of universally recognized
principles of international law").
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